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CHAPTER 2

Spinoza’s Critique of Religion : Reading the
Low in light of the High *
Steven Frankel

S

trauss’s early studies of Spinoza, including his first book, Spinoza’s

Critique of Religion (1930; henceforth SCR ), have been largely neglected
in favor of his later work. Such neglect is understandable: Strauss’s work
on Spinoza spans his entire career as a scholar and thinker, and includes his
discovery of esotericism—which played a critical role in his most authoritative
analysis of Spinoza. In addition, Strauss privately conceded problems with
the work. In a letter to Gerhard Kr ü ger in 1930, Strauss conceded that he had
been compelled to remain silent in public about the presuppositions that were
the point of departure for SCR . 1 Later he criticized the work publicly for not
taking seriously the possibility of return to premodern philosophy (¶¶21, 42).
It is somewhat surprising then that more than 30 years later, after its publication
in German, Strauss decided to have the book translated into English.
Ostensibly to explain his decision, Strauss prefaces the translation with an
autobiographical account of the genesis and development of his early views as
well as the inclusion of a later essay on Carl Schmitt (1932). One can recognize
many of the themes in SCR —for example, the tension between Athens and
Jerusalem, the inadequacy of the Enlightenment’s critique of religion, and the
development of Epicureanism, and others—which would preoccupy Strauss
over the course of his career. Still, Strauss’s decision to resurrect this early
work is puzzling.
The studied carelessness with which Strauss handles his autobiographical
account is in striking contrast to the attention he pays to the substance of the
preface. This becomes clear when we contrast the literary form of the essay with
the substantive argument: The literary form is an autobiographical narrative of a
young German Jew who seeks to escape the “theological-political predicament” by
either returning to the form of Jewish belief or else discovering a political alternative,
such as Zionism or liberalism (see ¶¶1–13). After pointing to the difficulties
with both of these political alternatives, Strauss seeks a qualified return to Jewish
belief mediated by modern thought (see ¶¶14–23). When this proves unworkable,
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he considers the return to “unqualified Jewish belief ” or orthodoxy. This leads him
to consider Spinoza’s critique of Judaism, and this is presumably the context within
which SCR was written (see ¶¶24–39). Ultimately, Strauss concludes that Spinoza’s
critique undermines not only Judaism but also philosophy, and he decides to return
to “Jewish medieval rationalism and its classical (Aristotelian and Platonic) foundation”
(see ¶¶40–42).
This straightforward account of his intellectual development is undermined by
the substance of his argument. Toward the center of his essay, Strauss confounds
the account of his development. 2 For example, as a young man, Strauss reports that
he was still considering the possibility of return to Jewish thought as mediated by
modern rationalism, particularly in the thought of Franz Rosenzweig. According
to his autobiographical narrative, he has not yet considered the possibility of return
to premodern forms of rationalism, and in fact would not do so until after the completion
of SCR . This is the conclusion of his autobiographical account: “I began
therefore to wonder whether the destruction of reason was not the outcome of
modern rationalism, as distinguished from pre-modern rationalism” (¶42).
However, in ¶21 Strauss breaks dramatically from the autobiographical narrative

to assert the conclusion of the autobiographical account. After he criticizes
Rosenzweig’s new thinking, he writes: “One begins to wonder whether our medieval
philosophy, and the old thinking of Aristotle, of which it made use, was not
more ‘empirical’ . . . than an unqualified empiricism” (¶21). In effect, Strauss has
moved the conclusion of the autobiography to the middle of the argument. This
casts doubt on the central claim of the autobiography, which presents Strauss as
gradually discovering the inadequacy of modern reason and the relevance of the
ancients. Even if we read this claim as merely an aside or parenthetical remark so
that it does not disturb the overall narrative, it is difficult to deny that Strauss is
more concerned with emphasizing his conclusions than with giving an account or
exploring the historical development of his thought. 3 Throughout the essay, he
presents several more examples of interrupting the narrative to emphasize mature
judgments that, though they shape his account, emerge only after the biographical
period portrayed in the essay. One example, which we shall discuss in greater detail
below, is Strauss’s hermeneutical maxim of reading the low in light of the high
(¶7). This principle supersedes the autobiographical narrative in terms of shaping
the content of the essay. Strauss’s goal is not to encourage further reflection upon
his autobiography or offer an account of his intellectual development, but rather to
guide our attention toward his mature thought.

The Theologico-Political Problem
Strauss begins the preface by referring to himself as “a young Jew born and raised in
Germany who found himself in the grips of the theologico-political predicament.” 4
Unfortunately, Strauss does not explain the nature of the theologico-political predicament,
or indicate what specifically about the predicament constrained him.
This is less of a mystery than it appears since the preface itself is devoted to explaining
how to read Spinoza’s Tractatus Theologico-Politicus (henceforth TTP ), which
in term is intended as an introduction to Strauss first book on the same topic. In
order to see what is at issue, it is useful therefore to remind ourselves of the main
themes of the theologico-political predicament as presented by Spinoza.
The TTP begins with an account of the role of superstition in political life.
The perdurance of superstition creates a theological problem because men imagine
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a divine source to explain their fortunes, and it also creates a political problem
because religious and political leaders are eager to manipulate them in order to
solidify their own power. 5 Spinoza focuses on the particular theologico-political
problem in Christendom and asks his readers to consider why Christians preach
love and practice hatred (P.4.1–2). He goes on to suggest that Christianity has been
hijacked and vulgarized by unscrupulous men who pervert its teachings in order
to satisfy their ambitions for the wealth and power of ecclesiastical offices. Among
their most insidious methods for obscuring and twisting the word of God is the
importation of foreign or superstitious ideas into the Bible, particularly “the theories
of Aristotelians and Platonists” (P.4.7). 6 Spinoza’s account assumes that reason
can identify superstition because reason can in principle provide a full account of
nature; nonetheless, philosophy is unable to adjudicate disputes among superstitious,
passionate individuals. To the contrary, philosophy is quickly transformed
into yet another instrument to bolster superstition. The power of superstition also
poses a political problem, because as superstitions gain in intensity, the passions
that accompany them also increase and threaten the stability of the state.
The theologico-political predicament refers to the superstitious condition of
mankind and the subsequent manipulation of those superstitions by religious and
political leaders. Spinoza’s solution to the problem has both political and theological
elements. Theologically, he distinguishes the essential teachings of Christianity
so that they can be purged of superstition, and restored in authority. The essential
teaching of the Bible, and the minimum requirement for salvation, is the practice
of charity and love toward all men. With her foundations restored, Christianity
can once again contribute to the peacefulness of society. These few dogmas of
Christianity do not exhaust our knowledge of God. Some men may seek and
achieve greater knowledge of God; however, such knowledge is not a theological

or political requirement for salvation. Politically, the pursuit of this knowledge is
irrelevant since it is available to only a few individuals (14.1.49–51). The state needs
only to secure safety and security for its citizens. For the most part, it leaves the
citizens free to pursue knowledge of God as they see fit—as long as that pursuit
is consistent with caritas . Spinoza envisions freedom, rather than reason or virtue,
as the cornerstone of political life with the hope that reason will flourish under
such conditions. 7 Strauss describes this regime as liberal democracy, and identifies
Spinoza as its founder. 8
The general analysis of the theologico-political predicament, directed toward a
larger Christian audience, was not the same problem faced by Strauss, “a young Jew
in Germany.” The version that Strauss inherited reflected the success of Spinoza’s
political solution in Germany, as well as its particular reception in the Jewish community.
Spinoza’s analysis was attractive to German Jews for several reasons: First,
Spinoza himself was born a Jew and his argument involves a deep knowledge of
Jewish commentaries on the Hebrew Bible. Strauss writes that many of his contemporaries
in the Jewish community celebrated Spinoza “on purely Jewish grounds”
(¶¶28, 26). Second, Spinoza’s solution to the theologico-political predicament provides
for a society where both Jews and Christians can live together in freedom
despite differences in their private beliefs. Strauss reports that many German Jews
believed that, thanks to Spinoza, “the millennial antagonism between Judaism
and Christianity was about to disappear” (¶27). The reason for this confidence is
that Spinoza had shown Jews that their religious law was purely political, and as a
result, had become obsolete with the destruction of the Jewish state. This provided
the theological argument for assimilation. Third, Spinoza’s analysis of the Jews in
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Chapter three of the TTP not only envisions Jews and Christians living together but
also considers the possibility that Jews might rebuild their former state. Certainly,
this argument was meant to complement his analysis of the destruction of the
Jewish state and not as a political strategy; nonetheless, Spinoza was celebrated by
some Jews as the founder of Zionism (cf. ¶11).
Strauss was in the grips of the theologico-political predicament as described
by Spinoza. The various solutions that Spinoza suggests, namely secular liberalism,
religious liberalism, and Zionism, appear to be the only options available to
the young Strauss. The organization of the essay adopts the framework set out
by Spinoza, considering each possibility in turn. As we shall see, each solution
falls short and the thread connecting these failures is the audacious confidence in
the power and capacity of reason to recognize and redress superstition. Spinoza’s
solutions are political solutions to the problem of superstition since they concede
that most people will remain superstitious; nonetheless, they offer strategies for
prudently managing superstition. By framing the issue in this way, as a matter of
reason ameliorating superstition, Spinoza suggests the political value of religion for
a stable community, while undermining the philosophical basis for revelation. The
result is that we are left with only unpalatable options. After turning to Spinoza’s
solutions to the theological political problem, Strauss next considers the modern
variants of Spinoza’s analysis, Heidegger’s atheism, and Rosenzweig’s piety. Both
fail to resolve the tension between politics, religion, and philosophy: either we
reject reason and embrace revelation, or else we reject revelation and, with it, the
well-being of our political communities.

Liberalism in Weimar
Strauss reports that the majority of German Jews celebrated Weimar and its historical
founder, Spinoza. Although Weimar originated with the defeat of Germany and
his humiliation in the Treaty of Versailles, she could trace her roots to a nobler,
deeper heritage in the French Revolution, and ultimately Spinoza’s account of the
theological-political problem. From their point of view, liberal democracy had deep
roots in Germany so that their Jewish faith presented no obstacle to assimilation.
They interpreted Weimar in the best or highest light, emphasizing its moderate
character and its attempt to integrate the “principles of 1789” with the “highest
German tradition” (¶2). This tradition includes the recognition of the rights of

man and a well-organized government of highly trained civil servants. Under this
regime, Jews flourished and participated in the cultural life of the Republic, and
Jewish life was strong; it even developed a new “science of Judaism” (¶7). Although
the German tradition also included strong anti-Jewish sentiments that dominated
medieval society, liberalism corrected this situation by protecting the rights of religious
minorities and purging the government of superstitious and irrational goals.
No wonder Weimar appeared to German Jews all the more precious and noble. 9
In direct contrast to this view, the Zionists, with whom Strauss openly sided,
viewed Weimar as weak at its very foundations and unable to defend itself when
challenged by ruthless enemies who viewed the Jews as outsiders who threatened
German Kultur with foreign culture and “ Civilisation .” 10 Strauss presents quotations
from Goethe, Nietzsche, and Heidegger that demonstrate the resilience of
anti-Jewish feelings in Germany (¶8). Ignoring their “precarious situation,” the
Jews of Weimar clung to the vain hope that liberalism would somehow prevail.
Strauss suggests that the election of Hindenburg in 1925 “showed everyone who had
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eyes to see that the Weimar Republic had only a short time to live,” because the nonliberal
tradition was “stronger in will” (¶3, emphasis added, S.F.). Strauss’s phrase
suggests that the weakness and vulnerability of Weimar were obvious, yet few,
particularly within the Jewish community, recognized it. The problem of superstition
comes to light in the first instance as the belief in the durability of liberalism
in Weimar.
History appears to have vindicated this Zionist critique of German Jewry.
Weimar is likely to be remembered as a cautionary tale of democracy without
strength, “of justice without a sword” (¶3). However, the Zionist vision was also
limited by the fact it is the product of the liberalism that it criticizes, rather than
of the Jewish tradition (cf. ¶11). The difficulty of making a balanced judgment
on Weimar is that it requires measuring the low elements against the higher ones.
Strauss suggests the following rule of thumb: “It is safer to understand the low in
the light of the high than the high in the light of the low. In doing the latter one
necessarily distorts the high, whereas in doing the former one does not deprive the
low of the freedom to reveal itself fully as what it is” (¶5). 11 To judge Weimar only
on its sorry record of weakness and collapse ignores its deeper and nobler roots and
“its moderate, non-radical character” (¶2). As a principle of interpretation, taking
one’s bearings from the highest rather than the lowest possibilities seems to be a
prudent rule of thumb.
But this principle is hardly self-evident. Strauss’s justification of this principle
on the grounds of safety raises the question: safer for whom? In the context of the
preface, where Strauss discusses repeatedly the “precarious” situation of the Jews in
Weimar and Europe, the primary consideration appears to be the safety of the Jews
in the Diaspora (¶¶6–8). His subsequent analysis highlights the dangers involved
in ignoring the lowest political elements in favor of dreams about perpetual peace.
He takes a particularly severe view of Hermann Cohen’s faith in progress and his
unwillingness to confront the less palatable side of power and coercion in politics
(cf. ¶¶32–33). Cohen was so concerned with interpreting the high in light of
the low that he underplayed the reality of the low. He condemned Spinoza “for
his Machiavellian-inspired hard-heartedness” only to fall victim to “the opposite
extreme” (¶32). But even Cohen appears to be a sober realist compared to the “fantastic
flights” that mesmerized those German Jews who feted Spinoza as a savior
(¶29). Strauss openly sides with the Zionists’ interpretation of the Jewish Question,
a position that confirms the wisdom of neglecting the high in politics in order to
protect oneself from the low. Nonetheless, as we shall see, his analysis ultimately
reveals the serious flaws with its neglect of the high.

Zionism as a Political Solution to the “Jewish Problem”
Spinoza inspired the Zionist movement by suggesting that there is a political solution
to the Jewish problem, which involves giving priority to politics over religion. 12
In his critique of purely political Zionism, Strauss draws our attention to the work

of Ahad Ha‘am (Asher Ginsberg, 1856–1927), “the founder of cultural Zionism.”
For Ahad Ha‘am, the theological questions had been already settled by Darwin
and science, both of which had allegedly proven that revelation was false (¶15).
This distinction helps to understand Strauss’s critique, specifically how Zionism
was largely correct in its analysis of liberalism in Germany and yet not able to
offer Jews a completely satisfying account of Judaism. In addition, this analysis of
a political solution that is theologically inadequate casts the theologico-political
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problem in sharper relief. The political situation of the Jews involves questions of
power and safety as well as theoretical questions about the meaning of Judaism. To
read the low in light of the high means to judge political solutions in light of their
higher, theoretical considerations. Strauss’s analysis shows that, while it is dangerous
to ignore practical political concerns, they need to be separated from the higher
theological questions. His critique of both the Zionists and the assimilationists
confirms this reading.
While Zionism has the virtue of grasping the limitations of liberalism in Europe
(cf. ¶6), it does not reject liberalism itself. Instead it attributes the failure of liberalism
to the fact that the Jews were at the mercy of other nations. Strauss quotes
Herzl on the failure of assimilation: “We are a nation—the enemy makes us a
nation whether we like it or not” (¶10). The assimilationists abandon Judaism in
the vain hope that they will be welcomed into a universal society. Political Zionism
exposes the fact that liberalism, despite its promise of a universal solution to the
Jewish Question, cannot create a view of justice strong enough to overcome discrimination.
Liberalism cannot eliminate hatred or superstition; at best, it can provide
only legal—rather than social—equality. But Strauss does not stop there. He
argues that Zionism also betrays Judaism in the belief that it can resolve the Jewish
Question by treating it merely as a problem of power, not divine punishment.
The virtue of Zionism was its sober claim that the Jewish Question could be
solved by power alone. Even cultural Zionism attempts to combine this view with
a project for the revival of Judaism, but its account of the high is vague and unsatisfying.
As a result, cultural Zionism tends to slide in opposite directions, “politics
(power politics) and divine revelation” (¶12). This result follows from Spinoza’s
account of the Jewish Question. Cultural Zionism attempts to escape the theologicalpolitical grip of Spinoza, but it cannot explain the basis of the high; instead it
either ignores the high in the case of political Zionism or reads the high in light of
the low in the case of cultural Zionism.

The Highest Goals of Political Life
Strauss exposes the failure of Zionism to resolve the Jewish Question as part of a
broader critique of liberalism. Following Spinoza, liberalism advocated the separation
of politics from religion on the grounds that such a separation would allow
politics to pursue more effectively the goals of safety and security. 13 By focusing
on the low, liberalism promised to leave people the freedom to pursue the high in
safety. The problem is that this freedom also allows for superstition, and thus liberalism
does not solve the problem of discrimination. To do so, liberalism would have
to prevent discrimination by severely limiting freedom of speech in both the public
and the private sphere. This would, in effect, destroy the private sphere and, with
it, the raison d’ être for the liberalism. The Zionists recognized that the problem
of superstition, and more particularly of anti-Jewish beliefs, was not resolved by
freedom of thought in the private sphere. To the contrary, prejudice against Jews
seemed to spread all the more widely in liberal democracies. Liberalism cannot
resolve the Jewish problem, or more generally the problem of the imagination in
political life. In Strauss’s words, the Jewish Question is an example of an “infinite,
absolute problem [which] cannot be solved” (¶12).
The claim that there are permanent problems shifts our attention from the particular
perspective of a young Jew in Weimar toward a broader understanding of
the limits of liberalism. The Jewish Question is one example of neglecting the high
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to manage the low. By allowing superstitious men freedom of thought, liberalism
contributes willy-nilly to the decline of philosophy and reason in political life.
Strauss again breaks from the autobiographical chronology with a judgment that
shapes the narrative. As with his claim about judging the lower in light of the
higher, he forces us to consider the claim more carefully and reflect on the role
of reason in political life. The Jewish problem is “the most manifest symbol” of
the political dimension of the “human problem,” which cannot be fully resolved
(¶12). He contrasts this with the problem of the Jewish individual who has become
alienated from his faith. This problem can be resolved by rejoining the Jewish community.
However, the larger problem of the Jewish community’s relation to other,
nonJewish communities cannot be resolved. Liberalism tries to resolve it by finding
a common understanding of justice or “a universal human society,” which is united
by its vision of justice (¶14).
Strauss presents the liberal solution as it appeared to his contemporaries, namely
that liberalism was the best solution to the Jewish problem either because Judaism
itself had been refuted (¶14) or because liberalism simply followed from Jewish
principles of justice (¶28). Spinoza provides the basis for both claims since his
argument is built on the dual premises of criticizing the Biblical teaching while
returning to its essential principle, the practice of charity. 14 The principle of charity
and toleration has the advantage of a broad consensus among various religious
faiths and even nonbelievers. For adherents of the Bible, Spinoza argues that the
truest and most accurate reading of the Bible reveals that its deepest teaching, the
one most necessary for salvation, is the practice of caritas . For all good men— honestos as Spinoza calls them—the benefits of this religious view are so apparent
that they would embrace it just as enthusiastically whether or not they are believers
( TTP 14.1.36). 15 In addition, by subordinating all other religious beliefs to charity,
liberalism allows a good deal of freedom of thought. Any views, even atheism, are
acceptable if they promote charity. 16

The Question of Return
In his critique of Weimar and Zionism, Strauss had cast a doubt on whether
Spinoza’s strategy of accommodating all views can work effectively without identifying
a firmer theoretical basis for the morality of caritas . He concludes that
“the Jewish problem is insoluble,” by which he means that the “liberal state cannot
provide a solution to the Jewish problem” (¶13). Strauss qualifies this claim
by admitting that liberalism is better than the alternatives of communism and
National Socialism, and that it does provide an “uneasy ‘solution to the Jewish
problem’” (¶13). Then, in striking contrast to his previous claims, he declares in
the next paragraph: “There is a Jewish problem that is humanly soluble” (¶14). This
problem, however, is not the wider political problem of the community in a precarious
situation, but rather of “the problem of the Western Jewish individual.” The
individual can return to traditional beliefs and avoid the illusions of liberalism. In
this sense, there is hope for solving our “deepest problem” and “most vital need”
theoretically, even if this does not end discrimination or superstition (¶14).
In moving from the political situation to the question of individual return,
Strauss has not entirely freed himself from the grips of the theologico-political
predicament. Although he has explained why a political solution cannot fully solve
the Jewish problem, he has not yet exposed the theoretical underpinnings of liberalism.
These underpinnings are first revealed when Strauss points out that “some
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of his contemporaries” believed that return was impossible because the traditional
faith “had been overthrown once and for all.” But the theoretical legacy of liberalism
is more complicated than simply rejecting revelation. This is indicated by the
fact that many more of Strauss’s contemporaries believed that it was possible to
grant science and history complete authority “without abandoning one iota of the
substance of the Jewish faith” (¶15). In short, the theologico-political predicament
is ambiguous: does it destroy faith or preserve it? In the next section of the essay,
Strauss examines the reasons for this ambiguity. As we shall see, both positions are

the result of a deliberate ambiguity about the status of Scripture within Spinoza’s
argument. As Strauss frees himself of Spinoza’s theologico-political grip, he parts
company with more of his contemporaries.
The path Strauss follows takes him through the intellectual currents of his time.
I emphasize that he follows this path, which he describes as a “qualified return”
or a return mediated by modernity, because it has already been marked out by its
founders including Martin Buber and Franz Rosenzweig as “new thinking.” As the
very title of the movement, “new thinking,” indicates, the movement represented
a conscious departure from the tradition so that the question of return takes on a
radical new meaning. The new thinking has several elements that interested Strauss
and explains why he chose to pursue it rather than traditional Judaism. For one
thing, the movement assigns authority to “present experience” rather than revealed
law or tradition. Further, the new thinking relies heavily on a broader critique of
reason and philosophy found in the work of Friedrich Nietzsche, a seminal thinker
for Strauss (¶17). Unlike earlier efforts to make Judaism compelling by showing
that “the truth of traditional Judaism is the religion of reason,” the new thinking
rejected reason as a criterion altogether (¶15). The movement followed Nietzsche in
arguing that the “return to Judaism requires today the overcoming of what one may
call the perennial obstacle to the Jewish faith: traditional philosophy” (¶16).
This critique of philosophy was based not only on its awareness of the limits of
reason but also on its thoroughgoing historicism. Following Nietzsche, Rosenzweig
argued that “the human soul has no unchangeable essence or limits but is essential
historical” (¶20). This claim constitutes the core of historicism’s claim to wisdom.
The historical dimension of all thought reveals previous claims to wisdom as
defective. It allows us to understand previous thinkers better than they understood
themselves. Historicism also provides a new approach to tradition: whereas the
question of return was also seen as a return to the revealed law, the new thinking
claims that we have always selected from the tradition according to the needs of our
age; now we can and should do so consciously.
According to the autobiographical account of the narrative, Strauss’s turn to
the new thinking was motivated by his question of whether a “return to Jewish
orthodoxy was not both possible and necessary” (¶24). Yet Strauss does not return
to orthodoxy. Instead he launches an investigation of Spinoza’s critique of religion
to see if there are grounds philosophically that prevent a return. The results of this
investigation are less clear in terms of orthodoxy, but point instead to the continuing
relevance of ancient philosophy. Like Socrates, who claims in the Apology that
his lifelong philosophical quest began with his pious attempts to understand and
verify the oracle of Delphi, Strauss frames his discovery of philosophy in terms
of his pious effort to return to orthodoxy. Whereas Socrates had investigated the
belief in the gods of the city, Strauss investigates the superstitions of his age, the
belief in historicism under the guise of the “new thinking.”
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The New Thinking
Strauss begins with Martin Buber’s foray into the new thinking in I and Thou .
Rather than begin with the tradition, he starts with “present experience,” which
is more immediate and less doubtful. If we are open to an encounter with the
divine, that is, if we have not dogmatically accepted the rationalism of Greek philosophy—
the path that recognizes only “what man knows by himself ”—we may
experience an absolute call that comes from outside of man and “goes against man’s
grain,” suddenly becomes more compelling (¶16). This experience finds confirmation
in the call of the prophets in the Bible. The prophets too have experienced the
speechless “call” of God and, in response, offer a human interpretation. Prophecy,
the speechless experience of the absolute, is in principle open to everyone. Our
return depends on our experience of the absolute and our recognition of this same
experience in the Bible.
Buber’s analysis places great weight on our interpretation of the absolute divine
experience. But which interpretation of this experience is the truest one? Cannot
the experience be tampered with? Is not the experience itself determined by our historical

conditions? Buber cannot answer these questions by using reason to judge
because he assumes that reason necessarily undermines such an experience. To
show us the danger that Buber’s position has invited, Strauss invents a dialogue
between Buber and Heidegger regarding whether the prophets sought to challenge
or affirm the people’s security. Although Buber would many years later consider
Heidegger’s critique, during the 1930s no such dialogue was possible because
“[a]t that time, Heidegger expressed his thought about revelation by silence or deed
rather than by speech” (¶17). To create a dialogue between Heidegger and Buber,
therefore, Strauss has to use later writings from each author that he could not have
had access to during this period of his development. 17 The confrontation between
Buber and Heidegger once again confounds our efforts to trace Strauss’s historical
development.
Strauss’s dialogue reveals that Heidegger has a “deeper understanding” of
the meaning and implications of the new thinking (¶17). Heidegger claims that
Buber’s interpretation of the absolute is merely wishful thinking. Indeed, against
Buber’s assertion that the warnings of the prophets do not “go against our grain,”
Heidegger shows that they merely confirm our wish for security, particularly the
security of our moral judgments by providing a “supra-human support for justice”
(¶18). Rather than dismiss philosophy, he identifies a goal shared by both ancient
philosophy and biblical revelation to find or demonstrate “the security of justice.”
The desire for justice is in turn related to the desire for the eternal, which does not
come into being or pass away. But the new thinking exposes this desire as “stemming
from ‘spirit of revenge’” rather than from either revelation or reason. Buber
had dismissed reason with the confidence that revelation could take its place as
the basis for justice. But Heidegger’s atheism cuts off this possibility and forces us
to confront our terrifying condition of insecurity and uncertainty. For him, terror
and cruelty are the true signs of “intellectual probity.” 18 There is no ultimate
ground for its belief in a summum bonum ; philosophy can no longer pretend to be
anything more than an act of will.
Strauss presents Heidegger’s critique of revelation in terms of a critique of the
high. In an unmistakable attack on Heidegger, he observes that “[n]ot every man
but every noble man is concerned with justice and righteousness and therefore
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with any possible or extra-human support of justice, or with the security of justice”
(¶18). In Strauss’s presentation, Heidegger’s pursuit of justice takes the form of a
demand for “intellectual probity,” which in turn attempts to expose every concern
for justice with the desire for security. 19 Intellectual probity should not be confused
with “the old love of truth.” 20 The difference, Strauss, explains, is that probity is
more explicit, even dogmatic, about its atheism. As a result, it rejects all attempts to
obscure the consequences of atheism, or to pretend that some sort of “semi-theism”
is possible. 21 In Heidegger’s hands, liberalism’s neutrality regarding the high gives
way to the explicit rejection of the transcendent and the apparent embrace of the
low. Conversely, Strauss shows the common ground shared by reason and revelation,
and in fact by all noble men, namely the concern for justice. Strauss’s return
aims at restoring this common ground rather than showing the victory of one alternative.
Of course, this personal attack does not mitigate the force of Heidegger’s
objections. Instead, it exposes a deeper problem: modern philosophy, which began
with a criticism of superstition in favor of reason, now abandons reason as a guide.
The result is that philosophy participates in the superstitions that it had previously
criticized and the cruelty that it had once abhorred. 22
Strauss’s path of return moves from Heidegger toward the origins of modernity
and Spinoza. 23 First, though, he considers a more serious attempt at a qualified
return to the Bible offered by Franz Rosenzweig. Paradoxically, Rosenzweig begins
his quest to return by denying the possibility of a return to Biblical faith. He draws
a distinction between what the authors of the Bible meant and how we understand
it today. The former is a historical concern characteristic of what he calls the “old
thinking,” while the latter is practiced in full awareness of the historical text and
our current situation, that is, how the text affects the present situation. It is important

to note that Rosenzweig rejects Spinoza’s principle of selecting from the text
by distinguishing between its essential and unessential parts. Such a distinction
can hardly be as objective as it claims, since it presumes the wisdom that it seeks
to find in the Bible. Rosenzweig avoids this problem by admitting that a “force”
rather than a principle guides our decision. The past, the “whole reality of Jewish
life,” offers materials for us to select and by virtue of the selection, transform into a
living force in our lives. The past becomes a set of resources for building the future,
but we are the ones who select from the past.
But as we scrutinize Rosenzweig’s selections, we cannot help but notice that
vitality is measured by consistency with modern liberal regimes. Thus, for example,
Rosenzweig does not find compelling the orthodox view of the Torah’s law,
which sees it in terms of prohibition and rejection; instead he interprets the law
in terms of liberation and transformation. This represents a far more optimistic
view of political possibilities and of the fate of liberal societies. Another example
of vitality is Rosenzweig’s rejection of Biblical miracles. Here vitality is associated
with skepticism and science. Rosenzweig claims he did not believe all the miracles
reported in the Torah but, rather, claims to be open to belief. 24 The orthodox
approach, in contrast, had far less confidence in the judgment of each individual
not only because of the limits of reason but also because such individuality could
undermine the cohesiveness of the community.
Like Buber, Rosenzweig wishes to make Judaism more consistent with experience,
but in practice this means making it more consistent with liberalism.
Instead of beginning from the Torah as law, as does Maimonides, for example,
Rosenzweig begins from one’s awareness of being a member of the chosen people,
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because such awareness is “the primary condition of the possibility of Jewish
consciousness” (¶21). This is at odds with the traditional view that the law as
revealed is the basis of the community. Strauss suggests that Rosenzweig consciously
begins with chosenness rather than law in order to reshape the tradition
so that it is more compatible with Christianity. This is in keeping with Spinoza’s
liberalism, where Judaism and Christianity are assimilated into a universal religion
that stresses caritas as the sole requirement for salvation. Rosenzweig did
not hope to return to traditional Judaism, but to adapt the tradition so that it
would be at home in Weimar. Strauss exposes Rosenzweig’s effort to reshape the
tradition, yet he does not criticize this reform simply as a betrayal of the tradition.
Rather, he wonders how to take one’s bearing in such a project: how can one
know that one’s proposals to change the tradition will result in its preservation
or deepening? Has Rosenzweig understood “the old in its depth”? His attempt to
transform Judaism in order to make it compatible with liberalism, a regime that
is ambiguous with respect to a summum bonum , suggest otherwise. 25 By transforming
Judaism to meet the needs of liberalism, Rosenzweig has lowered the
tradition rather than deepened it.
Strauss also suggests that Rosenzweig’s proffered reform has not deepened the
tradition, by contrasting him with Maimonides, who similarly attempted to alter the
tradition’s attitude toward philosophy. Curiously, Strauss approaches the superiority
of Maimonides in terms of his method for reshaping the tradition. Maimonides
was more loyal to the Jewish People, or at least more careful to preserve the appearance
of his loyalty to the tradition, than was Rosenzweig. Nothing exemplifies
this better than Maimonides insistence on placing Judaism above philosophy and
politics. Strauss says that Maimonides, in sharp contrast to Rosenzweig, wrote
Jewish books, not philosophical ones, “as a Jew he gives his assent where as a philosopher
he would suspend his assent” (cf. Guide of the Perplexed 2.16; HBS xiv).
In the preface, Strauss makes the same point in order to contrast Maimonides with
Rosenzweig, He points out that [w]hereas the classic work of what is called Jewish
medieval philosophy, the Guide of the Perplexed , is primarily not a philosophic
book but a Jewish book, Rosenzweig’s Star of Redemption is primarily not a Jewish
book but a “system of philosophy” (¶21). The difference between a Jewish book
and a philosophic book is that in a Jewish book, the authority of law precedes and

is distinguished from the authority of reason. 26 Rosenzweig, however, has already
rejected both ancient philosophy and reason as a guide. To make matters worse
from Strauss’s point of view, Rosenzweig’s philosophy is much more consistent
with Christianity than is traditional Judaism because its starting point is not the
law, but a secondary category like chosenness. In this sense, he treats the tradition
as a quarry, or set of resources, for crafting a Judeo-Christian society. This view is
important to keep in mind because Strauss will later call attention to Rosenzweig
and Cohen’s critique of Spinoza, which essentially claims that he was disloyal to
his people by exposing its flaws for all to see. In fact, Strauss here shows that
Rosenzweig has essentially done the same thing, with even less consciousness of
his debt to Spinoza.

The Return to Spinoza
The second half of Strauss’s preface (¶¶ 24–42) is devoted to Hermann Cohen’s
analysis of Spinoza. This is surprising, insofar as Cohen predated Rosenzweig and
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Buber. Moreover, his analysis stops short of the new thinking in that he holds reason
in high esteem, capable of guiding men and teaching them a universal moral
law consistent with Jewish law. Possibly Strauss was genuinely more impressed by
Cohen than by Rosenzweig. He describes Cohen as “a Jew of rare dedication” who
“symbolized more than anyone else the union of Jewish faith and German culture.”
Nor did Cohen neglect the high. In fact, he “surpassed in spiritual power” his colleagues
in philosophy and theology. However, we must be careful not to overstate
the influence of Cohen’s critique; after all, Strauss largely rejects Cohen’s analysis
of Spinoza. His tribute to Cohen is actually a refutation of Cohen’s approach to
philosophy. Indeed, he raises the question of whether Cohen could even be considered
a philosopher, suggesting instead that he is a rather limited, if well-meaning,
scholar. 27 In short, his presentation of Cohen is from the point of view of the
mature Strauss who has thoroughly rejected him. 28
Yet Rosenzweig’s judgment on Cohen plays an important role in Strauss’s presentation.
Rosenzweig admits that Cohen’s treatment of the evidence may not be
just; however, Rosenzweig argues that there is a deeper justification for Cohen’s
position. Spinoza took “for granted the philosophic detachment or freedom from
the tradition of his own people” (¶35). Philosophy may appear to confer freedom
by detaching one from the community, but this is an illusion on par with the
erroneous view that reason provides a liberating vantage point. Rejecting such
illusions, Rosenzweig claims that this detachment is nothing more than the
rejection of loyalty, love, and sympathy for one’s own community. Had Spinoza
cared more for his people, he would have helped them reinterpret their tradition
“in light of the highest [possibility, or failing that,] if necessary, better than
they understood themselves” (¶35). Thus, although the explicit topic of this
section of the essay is how to read Spinoza (or how Cohen misread Spinoza),
the judgment of Rosenzweig opens the radical question about changing a tradition.
Cohen, who was temperamentally conservative, was unable to grasp, “the
fact that the continuous and changing tradition . . . [depends on] revolutions and
sacrileges” (¶38).
As for Cohen’s critical reading of Spinoza, Strauss does show how Cohen helps
expose several central and apparently deliberate contradictions in the TTP . These
contradictions would reappear in Strauss’s mature interpretation of Spinoza; however,
Cohen was unable to resolve them correctly because of his conviction that
he has understood Spinoza better than Spinoza understood himself. This “idealizing
interpretation” is a variety of historicism, which explains an author’s work
as a product of history rather than deliberate choice. Cohen, for example, did not
consider that Spinoza’s style reflected a deliberate choice in light of persecution
and his political project. Strauss playfully and explicitly refutes this, and suggests
instead that Cohen “understood Spinoza too literally because he didn’t understand
him literally enough” (¶37). The difficulty in reading Spinoza correctly is determining
whether he means what he says, that is, whether we should read him literally.
The question of historical circumstances undoubtedly plays a role in Spinoza’s

presentation, but in order to measure this influence, we must understand Spinoza’s
metaphysical project. If Spinoza’s assertions contradict his metaphysical teaching,
then we are justified in considering his political circumstances to explain his argument.
29 Thus, Strauss’s section is meant to guide the reader away from his historicist
prejudice to a more thoughtful reading of Spinoza. The claim of the overall
narrative is that one can escape Spinoza’s theologico-political grip only by reading
him correctly.
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The Development of Strauss’s Interpretation of Spinoza
In addressing Cohen’s historicist interpretation of Spinoza, Strauss begins by putting
aside the autobiographical narrative to offer an account of Spinoza’s metaphysics
(¶27). To see more clearly the defects in Cohen’s hermeneutics, Strauss begins
with a literal reading of Spinoza’s political thought. According to this account,
Spinoza must be understood as part of modern philosophy’s break with ancient
philosophy. Spinoza did not initiate this break, but was “the heir of the modern
revolt” (¶29). Modern philosophy rejected the theoretical contemplation of nature
in favor of a more practical and useful approach. It sought to master rather than
contemplate nature. This was part of a political project to improve man’s comfort
and thereby secure the freedom to philosophize. Spinoza embraces the modern
project, but also attempts to restore the “dignity of speculation on the basis of
modern philosophy or science” (¶29).
Spinoza’s metaphysical starting point is also distinctively modern: all things
proceed from the one, but the process is not one of decay or descent, neither is it
one of creation. Rather it is an unfolding of individual, particular things that we
are to understand sub specie aeternatatis . 30 The “last word on the subject” is the
Ethics , where Spinoza argues that the highest form of knowledge is of particular
things. 31 In sharp contrast to the Bible, God is not therefore the highest source of
knowledge, but the process or unfolding of nature. Thus, on the question of the
high, Spinoza’s thought is ambiguous. On the one hand, he maintains the view of
ancient philosophy that philosophy is the highest activity for man; on the other
hand, his view is not grounded in nature but rather in the endless (and directionless)
unfolding of nature.
Spinoza’s political project, liberalism, reflects his ambiguity about the status of
the high. He begins, or appears to begin, from metaphysical axioms that provide
no basis or support for justice. 32 In fact, the goal of politics must be understood
in light of the mechanical universe within which it operates. Rather than refer
to intellectual or moral virtue, the regime must be directed toward security and
comfort. Nor can political leaders rely on some absolute standard of justice (from
nature or God) to fix their goal. They must guide man but rather by the toughminded
control of destructive passions and the fostering of more constructive ones
through, for example, a commercial society. Spinoza equates the passions with the
right of nature, so as to indicate that they are natural, even if they are not directed
toward any end other than the striving to persist.
Cohen’s Critique of Spinoza
The celebration of Spinoza by German Jews ref lects their appreciation of liberalism
as a regime that offered them unprecedented opportunities. Spinoza was the
saint who inaugurated “a new religion or religiousness which was to become a
wholly new kind of society, a new kind of Church” (¶27). That they neglected
the Machiavellian elements of his political thought and ignored his rejection
of the Biblical God is not surprising given their apparent f lourishing in liberal
democracy. To his credit, Cohen refused to ignore the less attractive elements of
Spinoza’s teaching (¶29). He was particularly disturbed by the effort to annul the
original excommunication, arguing instead that Spinoza had indeed betrayed the
Jewish people. Cohen was not concerned, according to Strauss, with violations
of ceremonial law or the denial of Mosaic authorship. Instead, he “condemned
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Spinoza because of his infidelity in the simple human sense, of his complete lack
of loyalty to his own people, of his acting like an enemy of the Jews and thus giving
aid and comfort to the many enemies of the Jews, of his behaving like a base
traitor” (¶19).
Cohen’s particular charges constitute a damning indictment: Spinoza accepts
and extends the Christian critique of Judaism. He falsely accuses Judaism of commanding
hatred of the enemy. He presents a picture of Judaism as carnal and
particularistic in contrast to the universal and spiritual picture of Christianity. His
efforts to show Judaism in a poor light lead him to contradict himself by then claiming
that prophecy is universal in order to promote the universalism of Christianity.
In Spinoza’s version of Judaism, the law is particularly devalued as having a purely
political, rather than moral or spiritual, role. Having reduced the law to a tribal
code, Spinoza suggests that the law’s author, the God of Israel, is merely a tribal
God. Not only then does Spinoza betray the Jewish people, he also blasphemes God
while suggesting that the Torah is “of merely human origin” (¶18).
In Cohen’s reading, Spinoza is so filled with malice—“he has no heart for the
people, no compassion”—that he grows obsessed with denigrating Judaism by any
means necessary (¶30). He does not hesitate, for instance, to praise Christianity or
encourage the anti-Jewish views of his Christian readers. He ignores contradictions
in his own argument if they undermine Judaism. His betrayal of his people and
philosophy is “humanly incomprehensible” and even demonic in that it is rooted in
a denial of any standard of morality. Cohen also argues that there was a more comprehensible
motive for Spinoza’s hostility toward Judaism. Like other Marranos,
whose fear of the Inquisition turned into hatred of its causes, namely Judaism,
Spinoza aimed his hatred at the victims rather than the perpetrators.
Strauss agrees with Cohen’s overall judgment that Spinoza is “amazingly
unscrupulous”; indeed, he argues that his own judgment is “in some ways even
stronger than Cohen’s” (¶31). But Cohen reads the TTP too literally and therefore
mistakenly thinks that Spinoza genuinely prefers Christianity to Judaism
because it appears more spiritual and universal. In his view, Spinoza wishes to
ennoble Christianity by convincing Christians to purge themselves of carnal relics
of Judaism, that is, by liberating Christianity from Judaism. This is where “Cohen
fails” to follow Spinoza’s argument. 33 Spinoza’s goal according to Strauss was to
fashion a liberal society that embraced the freedom to philosophy. The argument
that he crafted was not a betrayal of the Jewish people, nor does his primary allegiance
to philosophy mean that he is indifferent to the Jewish people. 34 To the
contrary, Spinoza provides a society wherein they could be citizens. In addition,
the universal dogmas of catholic faith in TTP Chapter 14 “are equally acceptable
to both Jews and Christians” (¶31). Such a society requires the abrogation of the
Mosaic law, but this law had become obsolete with the destruction of the state.
Strauss’s defense of Spinoza amounts to this: he “liberated Jews in the only way he
could think of ” given his philosophy (¶31).
Strauss’s critique of Spinoza is stronger than Cohen’s because Strauss does not
ignore the Machiavellian core of Spinoza’s project. Cohen was committed to a
theologico-political view that combined the Bible with Kant, who viewed God as
an “idea” that guarantees the existence of a universal moral law discoverable by reason.
The “idea” of God is the basis of morality, as well as of the optimistic belief in
the ultimate triumph of Good over Evil. 35 Kant’s moral law is realizable first only
in particular states, but it points toward a universal moral order, grounded in international
law and enforced by a league of nations. In Cohen’s version of creation and
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providence, the politics generates the theology. In other words, we need the “idea”
of God to justify a certain political order. Reason comes to theology’s aid to help
determine the requirements of a universal and just political order, and instructs
theology on its presuppositions.
But all of these beliefs are exposed as superstitions, albeit salutary superstitions,
within the confines of Spinoza’s metaphysics. Cohen’s thought and his interpretation

of Spinoza have a clear sense of the high, and he seeks wherever possible to read
the low in light of the high. According to Strauss, this leads to various problems
within Cohen’s own thought. For example, he tends to cover over the criminal
violence and destruction that attend revolutions. Similarly, he sees the purpose
of punishment solely in terms of promoting the well-being of the criminal. In his
single-minded attention to the high, Cohen appears to ignore the low altogether.
He “ignored the harsh political verities which Spinoza had stated so forcefully”
(¶36). In this, one wonders whether he did not help to prepare the generation of
Jews who did not have “eyes to see” the disaster that was approaching. In any case,
this tendency to neglect the low renders Cohen a woefully inadequate interpreter
of Spinoza because “the kind of interpretation which Spinoza calls for is not idealizing,
since his own doctrine is not idealistic” (¶36).
Strauss focuses our attention on two related problems in Cohen’s interpretation
that expose the problem that emerges with his idealizing philosophy. First, Cohen is
unable to conceive of the relation between reason and revelation as anything other
than harmonious. In addition, Cohen cannot grasp the meaning of Spinoza’s denial
of any natural support for the high. Both examples point us directly to Maimonides
and imply that not only did Cohen misinterpret Spinoza and Maimonides incorrectly
but also that Maimonides’s point of view was superior.
Cohen claims that Spinoza’s interpretation of Judaism does not recognize
the universalism of the prophets. For instance, Spinoza draws our attention to
Maimonides’s claim that a person cannot be saved unless he believes in Mosaic revelation.
This view suggests that obedience rather than reason is primary to piety.
Similarly, Maimonides claims that a non-Jew can be considered pious if he performs
the Noahide commandments as commandments of God, adding that if a
non-Jew performs them because they are rational, he is neither pious nor wise. Its
wisdom teaches that reason cannot supplant piety as a source of political authority.
Finally, Maimonides suggests that the Torah’s commandments themselves are
not rational, but are meant to address and cure idolatry, “an irrational practice.”
Maimonides begins from the opinions of the community before determining the
best way to enlighten the tradition. Irrational opinions may justify the commandments
while reason itself may not. 36 Leaving aside Spinoza, Strauss reports that the
Jewish tradition, as per Joseph Caro, confirms this view. Cohen ignores those elements
of the Jewish tradition, which suggests a tension between wisdom and piety
because he overestimates the power of reason and its compatibility with the law.
The other example that Strauss chooses focuses on the question of the highest
good. Cohen points out the following contradiction in the TTP : Spinoza claims
that Moses’ law is a divine law, that is, it points man toward the highest good or
intellectual love of God; yet, he denies that the Mosaic law aims at the highest
good. Strauss denies that this is a contradiction, because Spinoza does not mean
the law is divine in the sense of aiming toward salvation or even intellectual knowledge
of God. Rather, Spinoza means that the law is divine because it is believed to
be divine by Christian readers whom Spinoza addresses. There is no divine law in
the sense of a law with natural or rational ends. Cohen has not come to grips with
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the fact that neither God nor reason supports the moral law. Spinoza’s morality
is always tied to a relentless egoism. Following his teacher Machiavelli, Spinoza
conceives of nature in terms of individuals struggling to persist in their own being.
Nothing stands apart from or above this struggle that would allow us to judge it
in moral terms.
Cohen wants to understand the tradition as something that we can shape by
understanding the low or superstitious in light of reason, or the high. Despite
Strauss’s insistence on understanding the low in light of the high, he rejects
Cohen’s reading of the Jewish tradition. The reason for this is that Cohen has
not escaped the horizons set out by Spinoza. He “does not come to grips with the
fact that Spinoza’s critique is directed against the whole body” of Jewish teachings
and tradition (¶39). He believed that Spinoza had refuted orthodoxy, especially
miracles and law. Furthermore, Cohen agrees with Spinoza’s opposition to rabbinical

Judaism, which put great emphasis on ceremonial law. Modern Judaism has
liberated itself from the rabbinical view of law. Cohen’s understanding of Judaism,
by virtue of which he attacks Spinoza, is grounded in the “historical understanding
of the Bible,” which in fact was originated by Spinoza. Cohen recognizes that
his understanding of Judaism, for example, his distinction between mythical and
historical elements of the Bible, is not consistent with “our traditional exegesis.” In
short, Cohen offers a more positive view of Judaism as rational, but ultimately his
understanding of Torah is consistent with, and rests on Spinoza. Cohen’s attempt
to understand Spinoza better than he understood himself failed; in fact, Spinoza
understood Cohen better than Cohen understood himself.

Strauss’s Judgment on Spinoza
Strauss concludes the Preface by summarizing his argument in SCR on the consequences
of Spinoza’s critique of religion. Spinoza claims to refute orthodoxy, and
its particular claims about the divine inspiration of every word of the Bible, that
Moses was the author of the Torah, the account of miracles as violations of natural
law, etc. The TTP did succeed in refuting orthodoxy, but only if orthodoxy makes
claims that it cannot defend. But if Orthodoxy responds by making less ambitious
claims, for example, by admitting that such claims “cannot claim to possess the
binding power peculiar to the known,” than Spinoza has not refuted orthodoxy
(¶40). Biblical religion ultimately rests on the claim that God’s will is unfathomable.
This is the premise by which all orthodox claims are possible.
Spinoza has succeeded only in showing that there are contradictions in the
Biblical narrative but this only undermines an overly ambitious variety of orthodoxy,
which claims paradoxically to know the ways of God. Traditional Judaism,
however, makes no such claims and thus “cannot be refuted by experience or by
recourse to the principle of contradiction” (¶40). Spinoza was forced to overreach
by claiming to know more than he could about the whole of things, and he had
resort to mockery and ridicule in the place of argument to unseat religion. This
reveals his critique as fundamentally resting on an act of will or a decision rather
than reason. By exposing the defects of Spinoza’s critique, Strauss does not mean to
suggest that orthodoxy has triumphed over philosophy. Rather, he wishes to show
the defects inherent in the Enlightenment’s political project, which leaves men
freedom without guidance. The “self-destruction of reason” in modernity invites
another kind of return, a return to a preliberal thought. Such a return requires an
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investigation into method by which “heterodox thinkers of earlier ages wrote their
books” (¶42).

Conclusion: Progress or Return?
As we have seen, Strauss presents an autobiographical account meant to explain the
development of his understanding of Spinoza in the Preface to the translation of
his first book on Spinoza. But a careful examination of the Preface reveals the fact
that Strauss is neither explaining the development of his thought, nor simply giving
an account of his life as a young man. This becomes clear when we pay attention,
for example, to the fact that Strauss’s mature judgments guide his presentation of
the autobiographical materials. His assertion that it is safer to understand the low
in light of the high is particularly important in this regard. But what does Strauss
mean by the “high”? Strauss forces the reader to puzzle out this critical question,
which is the key to understanding the essay.
Instead of identifying the meaning of the “high,” he provides an account of his
efforts to escape “the grips of the theologico-political predicament” bequeathed to
modernity by Spinoza. This escape or liberation initially takes the form of return,
particularly a return to revelation. But this attempt to return proves exceptionally
difficult because Spinoza’s critique of revelation profoundly shapes the way
subsequent thinkers understand the tradition. Significantly, Spinoza is ambiguous
about the source and meaning of “the high”; specifically, he is unclear whether the
divine law is in some sense true or whether it is merely the product of superstition.
This ambiguity allows for a variety of readings of Spinoza, which were pursued by
Strauss’s community in Germany. The more optimistic interpretation affirmed the

divine foundation of morality, while others took Spinoza’s atheism as corroborating
the new virtue of “intellectual probity.” Neither view, however, managed fully to
escape Spinoza’s grip and appreciate the possibility of return. Strauss suggests that
the liberation from Spinoza is possible if we read Spinoza carefully, that is, if we
understand his political project, including his ambiguous treatment of the high,
in light of his metaphysics that denies the possibility of the high. In other words,
the political project must be understood as an attempt to obscure Spinoza’s view of
nature, which is entirely indifferent to human flourishing.
To liberate oneself from the grip of Spinoza means to understand his project
and also to recognize an alternative to his metaphysical and political views. Strauss
suggests that this is possible because Spinoza has not succeeded in refuting revelation.
“The genuine refutation of orthodoxy would require the proof that the world
and human life are perfectly intelligible without the assumption of a mysterious
God. . . . [M]an has to show himself theoretically and practically as the master of
the world and the master of life” (¶40). Spinoza has not done this; instead, in his
attempt to do so he has overstated the capacity of reason to provide a full account of
the whole and thereby rendered it questionable as a rational activity. To the clearsighted
descendants of Spinoza, philosophy appears to be the result not of rational
inquiry, but an act of will. This permits the provisional triumph of orthodoxy, but
without reason. Invariably, orthodoxy descends into fanaticism. Strauss envisions
a “return” to a piety that is checked by reason, and a philosophy that is mindful
of its limitations. Thus the restoration of the “high” requires the simultaneous
recovery of reason and revelation as potential candidates for the best life. Nor is
the possibility of such a recovery a matter for despair. Since we have the important
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works of medieval and ancient philosophy, we need only to excavate how such
issues appeared to thinkers before Spinoza. In teaching us to read Spinoza carefully,
Strauss also teaches us to read his predecessors carefully.
Since Strauss himself was not an observant Jew, it is easy to conclude that philosophy
has, in his eyes, already ultimately overcome revelation in its claims to the
high. 37 In fact, Strauss appears to say as much: “Philosophy or science, the highest
activity of man, is the attempt to replace opinion about ‘all things’ by knowledge
of ‘all things’; but opinion is the element of society; philosophy or science is the
attempt to dissolve the element in which society breathes, and thus it endangers
society.” The result is that philosophy “must respect the opinions on which society
rests” without “accepting them as true.” 38 Thus, even if we attribute to Strauss
the view that philosophy is the highest or best activity for man, we cannot avoid
the political problem of accommodating this view to our community, which rests
on a settled standard of justice. This tension between conventional opinion and
philosophy resembles the Platonic cave. Yet this tension has been entirely obscured
by modern philosophy, as exemplified in Spinoza’s metaphysics, which claims that
nature offers no support to either reason or revelation. In this sense, believers and
philosophers are in the same predicament: in order to restore a sense of the high,
they must first liberate themselves from the cave beneath the cave. 39

Notes
* Strauss published two editions of the autobiographical preface: the first as a preface
to the translation of SCR and the second as part of a collection of essays in LAM . The
two versions are nearly identical except that in the latter version Strauss divides several
of the longer paragraphs into shorter ones so that where there are 42 paragraphs in the
original essay, while there are 54 paragraphs in the later edition. Another important
difference is that in the later edition, Strauss refers to himself as being in the “grips”
of a theologico-political problem. This change, from “grip” is discussed below (see
note 22). This essay uses the paragraph numbering from the original essay in SCR . My
thanks to Professors Terence Marshall, Thomas Meyer, Richard Polt, Timothy Sean
Quinn, John Ray, and Martin D. Yaffe for their thoughtful comments (and objections)
to this essay.
1 . Strauss’s letter to Kr ü ger is dated January 7, 1930 ( GS–3 380–81). He blames his “boss,”

Julius Guttmann, for preventing him from writing more explicitly. For an overview of
the correspondence between Kr ü ger and Strauss, see Thomas L. Pangle, “Light Shed
on the Crucial Development of Strauss’s Thought by his Correspondence with Gerhard
Kr ü ger,” chapter 3 of the present volume.
2 . One of Strauss’s central hermeneutical principles is that careful authors have developed
their own manner of writing by studying other careful writers. In general, therefore,
“we learn to write by reading. A man learns to write well by reading well good books,
by reading well most carefully books which are carefully written” ( PAW 144). Strauss’s
commentaries on philosophical texts offer guidelines for reading carefully. One method
that he frequently employs, for example, is counting the number of paragraphs to determine
the central paragraph (cf. PAW 24–25).
3 . A good example of this is David Janssens’s fine study, Between Athens and Jerusalem:
Philosophy, Prophecy, and Politics in Leo Strauss’s Early Thought (Albany: SUNY Press
2008), 8–26. Janssens begins by attempting to follow Strauss’s preface as an account of
his early thought, but is quickly forced to cite other materials and sources to fill in the
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picture even to explain the meaning of Strauss’s description of the “theological-political
predicament.”
4 . The original essay indicated that Strauss was in the “grip” of the theologico-political
predicament. Strauss decided to make “grip” plural in the subsequent edition. His
choice may reflect the fact that he believed the theologico-political predicament had
multiple sources and expressions. I wish to thank Thomas Meyer for directing me to
this difference and its possible meaning.
5 . For a more extended analysis of the theologico-political predicament, see my “Politics
and Rhetoric: The Intended Audience of Spinoza’s Tractatus Theologico-Politicus ,”
Review of Metaphysics 52 (1998–99): 897–924.
6 . See my “Review Essay of Martin D. Yaffe’s translation and commentary of Spinoza’s
Tractatus ,” Interpretation 32, no. 2 (Spring 2005): 171–78.
7 . Spinoza also hoped to mitigate the damage done by theology, by creating a universal
faith whose only requirement was the practice of charity. In addition, he prescribed
political institutions based on power rather than theology, which were more consistent
with the natural asocial nature of man. Finally, by liberating philosophy from politics
and theology, he enlisted the help of science in promoting the well-being of the
citizens.
8 . Spinoza “was the philosopher who founded liberal democracy, a specifically modern
regime” (¶27).

9 . Allan Arkush, “Leo Strauss and Jewish Modernity,” in Leo Strauss and Judaism:
Jerusalem and Athens Revisited , ed. David Novak (Lanham, MD: Rowman &
Littlefield, 1996), 115.
10 . See Steven Smith, “How to Commemorate the 350th Anniversary of Spinoza’s
Expulsion,” Hebraic Political Studies 3, no. 2 (Spring 2008): 173.
11 . Emil Fackenheim also identifies this passage as critical to understanding Strauss,
but Fackenheim thinks that Strauss has not fully confronted the low as revealed in
the Holocaust. See his “Leo Strauss and Modern Judaism,” in Emil Fackenheim,
Jewish Philosophers and Jewish Philosophy , ed. Michael Morgan (Bloomington:
University of Indiana Press, 1996), 103, 104.
12 . Contrast this position with Hannah Arendt’s critique of Zionism. After the war,
Strauss continued to defend Israel on the grounds that it restored national pride
(see his letter to National Review in JPCM 413–14.). The preface was written in
August 1962, less than 3 months after Eichmann was hung in Jerusalem. Strauss’s
endorsement of Zionism on the grounds of restoring Jewish pride stands in sharp
contrast to Arendt’s Eichmann in Jerusalem , written during the same period.
13 . See TTP , chapter IV.
14 . Strauss explains in his 1959 Spinoza seminar: Spinoza insists that “[w]e must go
back to the Scriptures. And this Scripture is the document of revealed truth, and
forget everything which the theologians claim to know. And in that moment—up
to this point he says, by implication, there is only one authority: the word of God as
delivered in the Bible. Then he turns it around. We must even examine the authority
of the Bible. . . . That the Bible itself is true and divine cannot be assumed. It
must be found out. Perhaps it is not true and divine, or is only partly true and
divine. Therefore, to repeat, the argument of this work is ambiguous throughout.
There is a Biblicist argument, based on the accepted authority of the Bible, but
only of the Bible, as the word of God, and there is another argument which questions

this very premise. The real teaching of Spinoza is not the Biblicist argument,
but the other one” (29).
15 . After quoting this passage, Strauss observes that the dogmas of universal piety
“must be of such a kind that all moral men, all decent men, regardless of whether
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they are Confucians or Christians, or Greek pagans for example, would never
disagree. But this must somehow be in accordance with the Bible. That is the
difficulty. The dogmas must be acceptable to all decent men. Now I hope the philosophers
are decent men. Must they not also be dogmas which are acceptable to
the philosophers? And philosophers according to Spinoza cannot believe in a legislating
God, in a God who exercises providence. That’s the problem. . . . after having
said that the Bible demands nothing but charity, meaning love of neighbor—therefore,
opinions are free. But Spinoza knows that this principle . . . necessarily has
theoretical premises. . . . If that is so, the denial of these theoretical principles must
be prevented. And if the philosophers by definition deny these principles, the philosophers
must be persecuted” (Lecture 9, p. 172). The solution, Strauss suggests,
is that philosophers must pay lip-service to the essential dogmas, even if they do
not believe in them (cf. 176–77).
16 . See PAW 193–96.
17 . Richard Velkley shows how Strauss’s thought acquired a “renewed and deeper
engagement with Heidegger in the 1950s as Strauss acquired the publications of
[Heidegger’s] later thought.” See Heidegger, Strauss, and the Premises of Philosophy
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011), 69.
18 . See Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human , sec. 120 and 227.
19 . “Heidegger’s political engagements show that the furthering of [the renewal of the
question of being] takes precedence over any considerations of the good, the moral,
and the just, as these have been understood in the philosophic tradition as having
some universal articulation, reflecting ends (happiness, perfection, virtue) inherent
in human nature or reason” in Velkley, Heidegger , 93.
20 . See PLA 137–38 (endnote 13).
21 . Ibid.
22 . Strauss makes this point quite sharply in WIPP 26–27: “The crucial issue concerns
the status of those permanent characteristics of humanity, such as the distinction
between the noble and the base.” He goes on to associate the neglect of these
characteristics with Heidegger: “It was the contempt for these permanencies which
permitted the most radical historicist in 1933 to submit to, or rather to welcome,
as a dispensation of fate, the verdict of the least wise and least moderate part of his
nation which it was in its least wise and least moderate mood, and at the same time
to speak of wisdom and moderation. The biggest even of 1933 would rather seem
to have proved, if such a proof was necessary, that man cannot abandon the question
of the good society, and that he cannot free himself from the responsibility of
answering it by deferring to history or to any other power different from his own
reason.”
23 . Strauss will argue that “the ultimate justification of Spinoza’s critique is the atheism
from intellectual probity, which overcomes orthodoxy radically by understanding
it radically, i.e., without the polemical bitterness of the Enlightenment and the
equivocal reverence of romanticism” (¶39).
24 . Buber and Rosenzweig did not succeed in preserving the substance of the Jewish
tradition. Their strategy, which Strauss describes in Philosophy and Law as “internalization,”
manages to reinterpret the claims of the Jewish tradition (e.g., creation,
miracles, revelation, and prophecy) so that they would no longer conflict
with “intellectual probity.” For a lucid outline of Philosophy and Law , see Eve Adler,
“Translator’s Introduction,” PLA 1–20.
25 . Hobbes is less ambiguous and therefore more revealing than Spinoza on the question
of the greatest good. See Leviathan , chapter 11 .
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26 . As Hillel Fradkin points out: “there are according to Maimonides different sciences
of the law, or more precisely two: the legalistic science of the law or jurisprudence
and the true science of the law. The Guide is devoted to the latter.” See
Fradkin, “A Word Fitly Spoken: The Interpretation of Maimonides in the legacy
of Leo Strauss,” Leo Strauss and Judaism: Jerusalem and Athens Revisited , ed. David
Novak (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1996), 59.
27 . “Cohen commits the typical mistake of the conservative, which consists in concealing
the fact that the continuous and changing tradition . . . [depends on] revolutions
and sacrileges” (¶38). By “conservative,” Strauss does not mean politically
conservative. (Cohen’s left-wing political views, including his endorsement of
socialism and his hostility to capital punishment, are well known.) Rather, Strauss
means by “conservative” a strong orientation toward preserving the tradition that
precludes questioning and challenging it.
28 . As Strauss admits in 1972, it had been many decades since he had read Cohen seriously:
“I grew up in an environment in which Cohen was the center of attraction
for philosophically minded Jews who were devoted to Judaism; he was the master
whom they revered. But it is more than forty years since I last studied or even read
the Religion of Reason , and within the last twenty years I have only from time to
time read or looked into some of his other writings.” See “Introductory Essay to
Hermann Cohen,” JPCM 267.
29 . This also explains a host of apparent contradictions in Strauss’s explanation of
Spinoza. For example, Strauss says that the Ethics is the first and last word of
Spinoza, but he praises Cohen for beginning with the TTP , which he says is more
revealing.
30 . See Richard Kennington, “Analytic and Synthetic Methods in Spinoza’s Ethics ,” in
On Modern Origins: Essays in Early Modern Philosophy , ed. Pamela Kraus and Frank
Hunt (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2004), 205–28. For an extended discussion
of Kennington’s argument, see Joshua Parens, Maimonides and Spinoza: Their
Conflicting Views of Human Nature (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012),
193–212.
31 . But Strauss praises Cohen for focusing his study on Spinoza’s TTP rather than
the Ethics , a method that Strauss himself follows in his own writing and teaching
(¶39). In his seminar on Spinoza in 1959 at the University of Chicago, for example,
Strauss promises to turn to the Ethics after reading the TTP and the Political
Treatise , but does not do so.
32 . The ambivalence runs throughout Spinoza’s critique of the Bible. Spinoza wishes
to use the Bible to establish a liberal society, which in turn, calls into question the
very foundations of that society. As Strauss wrote in his 1936 study of Hobbes:
“Exactly as a Spinoza did later, Hobbes becomes an interpreter of the Bible . . . to
make use of the authority of Scriptures for his own theory, and then . . . to shake the
authority of Scriptures themselves.” Cited in Leora Batnitzky, “Leo Strauss and the
‘Theologico-Political Predicament,’” in The Cambridge Companion to Leo Strauss ,
ed. Steven B. Smith (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 47.
33 . In PAW 187, after claiming that Spinoza deliberately contradicts himself and that
we should always resolve these contradictions by accepting the “the statement most
opposed to what Spinoza considered the vulgar view,” Strauss says that “[o]nly
by following this rule can we understand Spinoza’s thought exactly as he himself
understood it and avoid the danger of becoming or remaining the dupes of his
accommodations.” Here Harry Wolfson takes the place of Cohen as an author who
explains Spinoza’s contradictions with historical reasons, that is, reasons “primarily
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based, not on Spinoza’s explicit statements, but on the history of the author’s life.”
Wolfson “admits that he is trying to understand Spinoza better than he understood
himself ” ( PAW 188).
34 . “[T]he Treatise is linked to its time, not because Spinoza’s serious or private
thought was determined by his ‘historical situation’ without his being aware of
it, but because he consciously and deliberately adapted, not his thought, but the
public expression of his thought, to what his time demanded or permitted. His plea
for ‘the freedom of philosophizing,’ and therefore for ‘the separation of philosophy
from theology,’ is linked to its time in the first place because the time lacked that
freedom and simultaneously offered reasonable prospects for its establishment”
( PAW 192).
35 . See also “Introductory Essay to Hermann Cohen,” JPCM 280: Cohen’s “‘optimism’
was too strong.”
36 . On the importance of the distinction between wisdom and piety in Maimonides,
see Raymond Weiss, Maimonides’ Ethics: The Encounter of Philosophic and Religious
Morality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991).
37 . This is Werner Dannhauser’s argument in “Athens and Jerusalem or Jerusalem
and Athens” in Leo Strauss and Judaism: Jerusalem and Athens Revisited , ed. David
Novak (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1996), 155–71. See Hilail Gildin’s
useful rejoinder, “D é j à Jew All Over Again: Dannhauser on Leo Strauss and
Atheism,” Interpretation 25, no. 1 (Fall 1997): 125–33.
38 . See “On a Forgotten Kind of Writing,” in WIPP 221–22.
39 . Philosophy may not disagree with Spinoza’s conclusions as much as his presentation
of those conclusions. In his essay on Kurt Riezler, Strauss presents a disagreement
between Socrates and Thucydides on whether the high is supported by
nature, or whether it is vulnerable precisely because it lacks support. Thucydides
appears to deny the existence of such support, but nonetheless is not indifferent to
its existence. See “Kurt Riezler,” WIPP 260.
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